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Abstract: In 1975, the Education for All Handicapped Children Act (renamed the Individuals with
Disabilities Education Act in 1990) established the essential obligation of special education law,
which is to develop a student’s individualized special education program that enables them to
receive a free appropriate public education (FAPE). FAPE was defined in the federal law as special
education and related services that: (a) are provided at public expense, (b) meet the standards of
the state education agency, (c) include preschool, elementary, or secondary education, and (d) are
provided in conformity with a student’s individualized education program (IEP). Thus, the IEP is the
blueprint of an individual student’s FAPE. The importance of FAPE has been shown in the number
of disputes that have arisen over the issue. In fact 85% to 90% of all special education litigation
involves disagreements over the FAPE that students receive. FAPE issues boil down to the process
and content of a student’s IEP. In this article, we differentiate procedural (process) and substantive
(content) violations and provide specific guidance on how to avoid both process and content errors
when drafting and implementing students’ IEPs.
Keywords: individualized educational program; law/legal issues; policy; procedural; substantive
1. Free Appropriate Public Education, the U.S. Supreme Court, and Developing and
Implementing Individualized Education Programs
Enacted in 1975, the Education of All Handicapped Children Act (EAHCA) set the
federal standard for the education of eligible students with disabilities in the United States.
Since 1975, the EAHCA has gone through a number of reauthorizations and amendments,
including in 1997 when it was retitled the Individuals with Disabilities Education Act
(IDEA), and again in 2004. Although these amendments somewhat altered sections of the
law and fine-tuned the procedures for special education, the fundamentals have remained
the same.
The EAHCA was established to provide federal money to state and local education
agencies to educate eligible children and youth with disabilities in accordance with the
federal law. For a state to qualify for assistance, the state had to demonstrate that it had a
policy in effect that ensured that all eligible students with disabilities would receive a free
appropriate public education (FAPE) in accordance with the terms of the law (Yell 2019).
Thus, a federal commitment to students with disabilities was established both in terms of
the educational rights of students with disabilities and as a fiscal partnership with the states
(Martin 2013; Stafford 1978). Congress established the individualized education program
(IEP) as the vehicle for actualizing an individual student’s FAPE. The purpose of this article
is to (a) examine the FAPE mandate of the IDEA, focusing on the procedural, substantive;
and implementation requirements; (b) differentiate procedural and substantive violations;
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and (c) offer guidance on crafting IEPs that avoid these errors, meet the FAPE requirements
of the IDEA, and provide academic and functional benefits to students with disabilities.
2. The FAPE Requirements of the IDEA
When the EAHCA was passed and signed by President Gerald Ford in 1972, the
law required that all eligible students with disabilities be provided with a FAPE. The
definition of FAPE in the EAHCA was special education and related services that would
(a) be provided at public expense, under public supervision and direction, and without
charge, (b) meet standards of the State educational agency, (c) include an appropriate
preschool, elementary, or secondary school education in the state involved, and (d) be
provided in conformity with the individualized education program (IDEA, 20 U.S.C. §
1401 (a)(18)). This definition has remained unchanged since the original passage of the law.
According to a Congressional author of the EAHCA, “We in Congress did not attempt to
define ‘appropriate’ in the law but instead, we established a baseline mechanism, a written
document called the individualized education program (IEP)” (Stafford 1978, p. 75), This
document, the IEP, therefore, provides the foundation and the blueprint for measuring and
evaluating the education provided to students with a disability. As the baseline mechanism
that ensures a FAPE for eligible students, each IEP must be designed to meet the unique
individual needs of each student. School professionals and a student’s parents must be
involved in crafting the student’s IEP. According to the U.S Supreme Court, the IEP is the
“modus operandi of the law” (Burlington School Committee v Massachusetts Department of
Education, p. 363).
Despite the specification that school personnel and a student’s parents collaborate
in the development of the student’s IEP, whether the IEP actually confers a FAPE has
sometimes been a controversial issue. As the Congressional authors of the IDEA recognized
disputes would occur regarding a student’s special education program in his or her IEP, they
included resolution mechanisms whereby parents, and sometimes school district officials,
could request a review by an impartial due process hearing officer. Following a due process
hearing, either party could appeal part or all of a decision to state or federal court. As
neither the language of the EAHCA nor the language of the regulations implementing
the law specified what constituted an appropriate education, it would be up to the courts,
and especially the U.S. Supreme Court, to clarify how IEP teams could ensure the special
education programs they develop and implement provide students with a FAPE (Conroy
and Yell 2019; Crockett and Yell 2008). In fact, the U.S. Supreme Court has heard two cases
interpreting the FAPE mandate of the IDEA: Board of Education v. Rowley (1982; hereinafter
Rowley) and Endrew F. v. Douglas County School District (2017; hereinafter Endrew F.). We
next briefly review these cases and what they mean for school district personnel having to
develop and implement students’ IEPs.
3. The U.S. Supreme Court and FAPE
3.1. Board of Education v. Rowley (1982)
Amy Rowley was a young girl who was deaf. She attended the Furnace Woods
Elementary School in the Hendrick Hudson School District in Peekskill, NY. Prior to
attending kindergarten, Amy’s parents and school officials met and decided to place
Amy in a regular kindergarten class to determine what services she would need. School
personnel took measures to prepare for Amy’s arrival at the public elementary school,
such as having school officials take courses in sign language interpretation and providing
devices to facilitate communication with Amy’s parents who were also deaf. Amy was also
given an FM hearing aid, which amplified words spoken into a wireless receiver by the
teacher or fellow students during certain classroom activities.
An IEP was prepared for Amy during the fall of her first-grade year. She would
remain in a regular classroom during her first-grade year and would continue to use the
FM hearing aid. She would also receive instruction from a tutor for the deaf for one hour
each day and from a speech therapist for three hours each week. The Rowleys agreed
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with parts of the IEP but insisted that Amy also be provided a qualified sign language
interpreter in academic classes. School district officials agreed to provide an interpreter in
Amy’s kindergarten class for an experimental period, but after one week, the interpreter
had reported that Amy did not need his services at that time. After consulting with the
school’s Committee on the Handicapped and collecting testimony from teachers and other
school personnel, the school’s administrators decided that Amy did not need the interpreter
while in first grade. After the request for the personal interpreter was denied, the parents
requested a hearing from an examiner who sided with the district, and agreed Amy was
indeed receiving a FAPE.
Rowley was eventually heard before the U.S. district court. The judge in the case
noted that Amy had an IQ of 122, performed above average academically in class, was well-
adjusted, had many friends among her peers, and interacted well with her teachers. The
judge also determined the FAPE mandate of the EAHCA required “each handicapped child
be given an opportunity to achieve his full potential commensurate with the opportunity
provided to other children” (Rowley, 1980, p. 534). The court ruled even though evidence
established Amy was receiving an adequate education, district officials failed to consider
“the importance of comparing her performance to that of non-handicapped students of
similar intellectual caliber and comparable energy and initiative” (Rowley, 1980, p. 534).
Thus, the court ruled that the by not providing Amy with a sign language interpreter, the
school district had failed to provide Amy with a FAPE. The school district appealed to the
Second Circuit, which affirmed the lower court’s ruling. Officials in the Henrick Hudson
School District then exercised their final appeal to the U.S. Supreme Court. The appeal was
granted and on March 23, 1982 oral arguments were made in the first special education
case to be argued before the High Court. In this case, the Supreme Court considered two
primary questions, (a). What was meant by the law’s FAPE requirement, and (b) what is
the role of state and federal courts in exercising a review under the EAHCA.
During the case, a primary issue that the Justices struggled with was the absence of
any clear definition of what an “appropriate” education is for students with a disability.
They concluded the main intent of the Act was “more to open the door of public education
by the means of specialized education services than to guarantee any substantive level of
education once inside” (Rowley, 1982, p. 177). Chief Justice William Rehnquist noted in his
majority opinion that the law “set forth extensive procedures to be followed in formulating
personalized education programs” (Rowley, 1982, p. 192) and “that adequate compliance
with the procedures prescribed would in most cases assure much if not all of what Congress
wished in the way of substantive content in an IEP” (Rowley, 1982, p. 204). As a result,
schools were required to provide access to education for students with a disability but
were not required to ensure these students were achieving at the same level as their peers
(Wenkart 2009).
The High Court established a two-step test for determining if a school district had met
the FAPE standard of the EAHCA. The test, which would be used by independent hearing
officers (IHOs), administrative law judges (ALJs), and state and federal judges when ruling
in FAPE cases, required that the first questions asked was if the school district complied
with the procedures set forth in the Act and second, was if the individualized educational
program developed through the Act’s procedures was reasonably calculated to enable
the child to receive educational benefits? The first part of the Rowley test was procedural
and stressed the importance of schools adhering to the procedural requirements of the
IDEA when determining if a school had provided a FAPE. The second part of the Rowley
test was substantive and required courts to examine a student’s IEP to determine whether
the IEP developed by the school was reasonably calculated to enable a student to receive
educational benefits. The High Court recognized the more difficult nature of this second
part of the test: “The determination of when handicapped children are receiving sufficient
educational benefits to satisfy the requirements of the Act presents a more difficult problem”
(Rowley, 1982, p. 198). Nonetheless, the according to the U.S. Supreme Court, “If these
requirements are met, the State has complied with the obligations imposed by Congress
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and the courts can require no more” (Rowley, 1982, p. 207). The Supreme Court concluded
the school district had indeed met the requirements of the two-part FAPE test to Amy and
had indeed complied with the language of the EAHCA.
As the Supreme Court did not “establish any one test for determining the adequacy
of educational benefits conferred upon all children covered by the Act” (Rowley, 1982,
p. 204), the lower courts began to adopt different standards to determine what degree
of educational benefit was necessary to provide FAPE. According to Yell and Bateman
(2017), some courts of circuit courts adopted a higher standard by which to determine
the educational benefit needed to confer a FAPE. However, most circuit courts adopted
a lower standard of educational benefit to determine a FAPE. Courts that used a lower
standard often ruled that if a school district provided some degree of educational benefit,
no matter how small, the district conferred a FAPE (Johnson 2012; Seligmann 2017; Yell
and Bateman 2017). This division among the circuit courts made it likely that eventually
the High Court would hear another FAPE case. That opportunity presented itself 35 years
after the Supreme Court’s ruling in Rowley. The FAPE case appealed to the Supreme Court
was out of the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Tenth Circuit: Endrew F. v. Douglas County
Public School District (2015).
3.2. Endrew F. v. Douglas County School District (2017)
Anyone who has spent any length of time in the educational world knows that there
is never a set standard by which all students or schools can be measured. Special education
and the IDEA itself are built on the notion that students benefit from individualized and
specialized programs that uniquely fit a student’s needs (Aron 2005). The standard set by
Rowley is still an important measuring stick which an IEP must stand up to, but the recent
case of Endrew F. has altered that standard (Davidson 2016; Waterstone 2017; Zirkel 2019).
Endrew F., who was called Drew by his parents, was diagnosed with autism and
attention-deficit hyperactivity disorder (ADHD) disability from a young age. Drew had
attended the Summit View Elementary School in the Douglas County School District from
pre-k through fourth grade and had been furnished with an IEP every year. However, by
Drew’s fourth grade year, his parents were dissatisfied with the progress he was making
and believed that his IEP was too similar to his previous IEPs. As a result, the parents
withdrew him from the district and enrolled him in a private school, the Firefly Autism
House. While at the private school, a behavioral intervention plan was developed which
addressed many of Drew’s challenging behaviors and he began to make academic gains
that he had not made in the public school setting. As Drew’s parents wanted him to attend
the Douglas County School District, they and the school personnel developed a new IEP
for Drew. Unfortunately, Drew’s parents decided that the new IEP was too similar to his
previous fourth grade IEP and did not include behavioral interventions. His parents then
filed a complaint seeking tuition reimbursement from the school to compensate for Drew’s
education at the private school. In order for the parents to receive this reimbursement, they
would need to show that the school district had not provided Drew with a FAPE.
As Drew’s case worked its way up through the due process hearing, district court and
U.S. Court of Appeals for the Tenth Circuit, the low educational benefit standard set by
the tenth circuit court was applied at each level. According to the tenth circuit’s education
benefit standard, the school district had provided educational benefit that was more than de
minimis, thus providing him with a FAPE. Following the ruling against them in the circuit
court, Drew’s parents filed an appeal with the U.S Supreme Court. The main question
pertaining to this case was what is the level of educational benefit that school districts had
confer on students with disabilities to provide them with a FAPE as guaranteed by the
IDEA? The High Court accepted the appeal and heard the case on 17 January 2017.
Chief Justice of the Supreme Court John Roberts wrote the unanimous ruling for the
Court, which was issued on 22 March 2017. In the opinion, Justice Roberts wrote that in
Rowley the High Court had declined to endorse any one standard to assist lower courts to
determine when students with disabilities are receiving sufficient educational benefits to
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satisfy the FAPE requirements of the IDEA but noted “that more difficult problem is before
us today” (Endrew F., 2017, p. 993). The new educational benefit standard announced in the
Endrew F. ruling was “to meet its substantive obligation under the IDEA, a school must
offer an IEP reasonably calculated to enable a child to make progress appropriate in light
of the child’s circumstances” (Endrew F., 2017, p. 1001). Justice Roberts asserted that the
“the essential function of an IEP is to set out a plan for pursuing academic and functional
advancement” (Endrew F., 2017, p 992). He further wrote that the new educational benefit
standard was “markedly more demanding than the merely more than de minimis” test
applied by the Tenth Circuit . . . ” (Endrew F., 2017, p. 992). In its ruling, the Supreme Court
vacated or annulled the tenth circuit court’s previous ruling in Endrew F. and instructed the
tenth circuit court to reissue its ruling in light of the new standard.
The tenth circuit court then remanded the ruling in Endrew F. to the district court.
According to the district judge, Lewis Babcock “the April 2010 IEP offered to (Drew) by
the District was insufficient to create an educational plan that was reasonably calculated
to enable Petitioner to make progress, even in light of his unique circumstances, based on
the continued pattern of unambitious goals and objectives of his prior IEPs” (Endrew F.,
2018, p.16). Furthermore, the judge noted that Drew’s IEP “was clearly just a continuation
of the District’s educational plan that had previously only resulted in minimal academic
and functional progress” (Endrew F., 2018, p.16). Furthermore, the judge noted that the
district’s failure to address Drew’s behaviors “impacted his ability to make progress on
his educational and functional goals” (Endrew F., 2018, p.17). Thus, district court judge
overturned his ruling and held that under the Supreme Court’s new educational benefit
standard, the Douglas County School District had failed to provide Drew with a FAPE and
the Firefly Autism House had provided a good education. Drew’s parents, therefore, were
intitled to reimbursement tuition from the district to cover the costs of the private school
and attorneys’ fees (Turnbull et al. 2018). The award for the costs incurred at the private
facility and reasonable attorneys’ fees and litigation costs, amounted to $1.3 million dollars
(Aguilar 2018).
4. Procedural, and Substantive Violations of FAPE
The two seminal Supreme Court decisions on FAPE, Rowley and Endrew F., set forth a
two-part test that impartial hearing officers (IHOs), Administrative Law Judge (ALJs), and
state and federal judges must apply to the facts of the case when determining if a school
district provided a FAPE. The first part of the test, the procedural litmus test, was from
the Rowley ruling. In this part of the test, the IHO, ALJ, or judge determines if the school
district followed the procedures of the IDEA. The IDEA includes a number of procedural
requirements to which school district personnel must adhere (e.g., ten-day notification
required for parents prior to a meeting). Additional guidance has been provided by cases
heard in the 3rd (e.g., Ridley School District v. M.R. and J.R. ex rel. E.R., 2012; D.B. v.
Gloucester Township School District, 2012), and the 9th Circuits (e.g., M.L. v. Federal Way
School District, 2004). Although in many cases these requirements are straightforward and
easily understood, school districts still make common procedural errors, examples of which
can be found in Figure 1.
The second part of the test, which is the substantive or educational benefit component,
is from the Endrew F. ruling. Recall in the Rowley test the second part of the test was
a follows: Was a student’s IEP reasonably calculated to enable the student to receive
educational benefit? The Endrew standard changed the second question as follows: Was
a student’s IEP reasonably calculated to enable a student to make progress appropriate
in light of his or her circumstances? Thus, in the second part of the test, the HO, ALJ, or
judge determines if students’ IEP meets this new educational benefit standard and if the
IEP confers more than trivial or de minimis benefit to a student.
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The second part of the test, which is the substantive or educational benefit compo-
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cational benefit? The Endrew standard changed the second question as follows: Was a 
student’s IEP reasonably calculated to enable a student to make progress appropriate in 
light of his or her circumstances? Thus, in the second part of the test, the HO, ALJ, or judge 
determines if students’ IEP meets this new educational benefit standard and if the IEP 
confers more than trivial or de minimis benefit to a student. 
Recall also that the Supreme Court in both Rowley and Endrew F. addressed the diffi-
culty of determining the degree of educational benefit required in order to meet the FAPE 
requirements of the IDEA. This is largely because the IDEA provides no specific infor-
mation on the substantive requirements. Nonetheless, the courts, particularly the Su-
preme Court in Rowley, have divided the FAPE requirement into two components, the 
procedural requirements and substantive requirements. Moreover, in the enactment of 
the Individuals with Disabilities Education Improvement Act in 2004, Congress empha-
sized the procedural and substantive distinction in matters involving a violation of a stu-
dent’s FAPE. The law now required that a hearing officer’s ruling in a FAPE case “shall 
be made on substantive grounds [emphasis added] based on a determination of whether 
the child received a free appropriate public education” (IDEA, 20 U.S.C. 1415[f][3][E][i], 
2004). Moreover, only certain procedural errors results in a substantive FAPE violation. 
To arise a substantive violation, the school districts errors must have: (I) impeded the 
child’s right to a free appropriate public education; (II) significantly impeded the parents’ 
opportunity to participate in the decision-making process regarding the provision of a 
free appropriate public education to the parents’ child; or (III) caused a deprivation of 
educational benefits (IDEA, 20 U.S.C. 1415[f][3][E][ii], 2004). Additional guidance has 
been provided in U.S. District Court’s Kirby v. Cabell County Board of Education, (D.WV. 
2006). Despite this guidance, schools commonly make similar substantive errors, which 
are listed in Figure 2. 
Recall also that the Supreme Court in both Rowley and Endrew F. addressed the
difficulty of determining the de ree of educational benefit required in order to meet the
FAPE requirements of the IDEA. This is largely because the IDEA provides no specific
information on the substantive requirements. Nonetheless, the courts, particularly the
Supreme Court in Rowley, have divided the FAPE requirement into two components, the
procedural requirements and substantive requirements. Moreover, in the enactment of the
Individuals with Disabilities Education Improvement Act in 2004, Congress emphasized
the procedural and substantive distinction in matters involving a violation of a student’s
FAPE. The law now required that a hearing officer’s ruling in a FAPE case “shall be
made on substantive grounds [emphasis added] based on a determination of whether the
child received a free appropriate public education” (IDEA, 20 U.S.C. 1415[f][3][E][i], 2004).
Moreover, only certain procedural errors results in a substantive FAPE violation. To arise a
substantive violation, the school districts errors must have: (I) impeded the child’s right to
a free appropriate public education; (II) significantly impeded the parents’ opportunity to
participate in the decision-making process regarding the provision of a free appropriate
public education to the parents’ child; or (III) caused a deprivation of educational benefits
(IDEA, 20 U.S.C. 1415[f][3][E][ii], 2004). Additional guidance has been provided in U.S.
District Court’s Kirby v. Cabell County Board of Education, (D.WV. 2006). Despite this
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As Berney and Gilsbach (2017) pointed out, the statutory distinction made by Congress
in 2004 codified the procedural and substantive distinction previously identified by the
courts. Although the Rowley/Endrew F. test is primarily a tool to be used by IHOs, ALJs,
and judges when determining FAPE, school administrators and teachers may also use the
two-part test to assess the development and implementation of their students’ IEPs. When
using these tests, school personnel should ensure that the (a) procedural requirements
of the IDEA and applicable state laws are followed and (b) the content of a student’s
IEP will enable him or her to make progress in light of the student’s unique individual
circumstances. The degree of progress will likely be made by examining the likely or actual
results of a student’s IEP (Hott et al. 2021; Zirkel 2019).
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As the original defining case of special education law that pertains to a measurement 
of FAPE, the procedural standard, or part one of the two-part test set by Rowley still ap-
plies with respect to ensuring that schools meet the procedural requirements of the IDEA 
(U.S. Department of Education 2017). The second part of the Rowley test, whether a stu-
dent’s IEP was reasonably calculated to enable the student to receive educational benefit, 
has been replaced by the Endrew F. standard that a student’s IEP must be reasonably cal-
culated to enable him or her to make progress appropriate in light of the student’s circum-
stances. To meet this higher standard, school personnel must ensure that objectives and 
goals are ambitious enough to enable progress. Add to these procedural and substantive 
standards to which special educators must adhere, school district personnel must also im-
plement student’ IEP as agreed upon. We next provide guidance on how school adminis-
trators and teachers can develop and implement IEPs that meet the procedural, substan-
tive, and implementation requirements of the IDEA. 
5. Developing IEPs That Meet the Procedural, Substantive, and Implementation  
Requirements of the IDEA 
The rulings we have reviewed have critical implications for special education admin-
istrators and teachers. We next point out the essential guidance provided in this decision. 
1. Ensure that school district officials and personnel understand and adhere to the 
procedural requirements of the IDEA. Violation of certain procedural requirements, in 
and of themselves, could results in the denial of FAPE to a student with disabilities eligible 
for services under the IDEA. Foremost among these procedural violations that may violate 
a student’s right to a FAPE is any misstep that effectively results in the student’s parents 
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s the original defining case of special ed cation law that pertains to a measureme t
of FAPE, the procedural standard, or part one of the two-part test set by Rowley still applies
with respect to ensuring that schools meet the procedural requirements of the IDEA (U.S.
Department of Education 2017). The second part of the Rowley test, whether a student’s
IEP was reasonably calculated to enable the student to receive educational benefit, has
been replaced by the Endrew F. standard that a student’s IEP must be reasonably calculated
to enable him or her to make progress appropriate in light of the student’s circumstances.
To meet this higher standard, school personnel must ensure that objectives and goals are
ambitious enough to enable progress. Add to these procedural and substantive standards
to which special educators must adhere, school district personnel must also implement
student’ IEP as agreed upon. We next provide guidance on how school administrators
and teachers can develop and implement IEPs that meet the procedural, substantive, and
implementation requirements of the IDEA.
5. Developing IEPs That Meet the Procedural, Substantive, and Implementation
Requirements of the IDEA
The rulings we have reviewed have critical implications for special education ad-
ministrators and teachers. We next point out the essential guidance provided in this
decision.
1. Ensure that school district officials and personnel understand and adhere to the
procedural requirements of the IDEA. Violation of certain procedural requirements, in
and of themselves, could results in the denial of FAPE to a student with disabilities eligible
for services under the IDEA. Foremost among these procedural violations that may violate
a student’s right to a FAPE is any misstep that effectively results in the student’s parents
not being involved in the special education decision-making process. A number of special
education-related cases, including cases out of the U.S. Supreme Court, have confirmed
the obligation of schools to ensure that parents participate in the special education process
under the IDEA (Conroy and Y ll 2019). The Ninth Circuit st essing the imp rt nce of
nvolving parents from assessment to IEP formulation to implementation. In other words,
a student’ parents must be involved in the assessment, developing heir child’s IEP, and b
vi ed with frequent and reports of their child’s prog ess toward their annual goals. I
earlier ca , the ninth circ it court also noted that parental rights are the “very essenc
of th IDEA” and if these rights are abridged in any way, it is very likely t t the student
Laws 2021, 10, 38 8 of 11
will be denied a FAPE. (Amanda J. v. Clark County School District, 2001, p. 892). Figure 3 is a
checklist that school districts may follow to prevent such errors.
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clude the following components: (a) target behavior, (b) condition under which measure-
ment will occur, and (c) criteria for acceptable performance (Yell 2019). Unfortunately, as 
Barbara Bateman observed in 2017, “too few IEP members know how to write measurable 
goals and too few goal writers intend that anyone ever actually measure the progress the 
child has made” (p. 98). A problem, which Bateman referred as “the cycle of non-account-
ability, (p. 98)” if not addressed often will lead to IEPs that will not meet the Endrew F. 
standard. If school district officials do not if not address the non-accountability cycle often 
will lead to IEPs that will not meet the Endrew F. standard. School district officials can best 
2. Ensure that special educators are skilled in developing IEPs that are reasonable
calculated to enable students to ake progress appropriate in light of their circu -
stances. Students’ IEPs must be written and implemented so as to enable them to meet the
new, higher standard of educational benefit, which is the U.S. Supreme Court’s Endrew
F. test. According to Zirkel (2017) the substantive aspect of FAPE focus on the actual or
likely results of student’s IEPs. To ensure that IEPs meet this new standard, special educator
administrators and teachers must ensure that their IEPs appropriately address the following
requirements. First, IEPs must be based on full, individualized assessment of a student’s
academic and functional needs so that an IEP can be developed. Second, a student’s present
levels of academic achievement and functional performance (PLAAFP) statements, upon
which a student’s IEP are based, must, in effect, become a baseline by which a student’s
progress toward his or her goals can be measured and reported. Third, annual goals must be
written so they are measurable. In general, a measurable goal should include the following
components: (a) target behavior, (b) condition under which measurement will occur, and (c)
criteria for acceptable performance (Yell 2019). Unfortunately, as Barbara Bateman observed
in 2017, “too few IEP members know how to write measurable goals and too few goal writers
intend that anyone ever actually measure the progress the child has made” (Bateman 2017,
p. 98). A problem, which Bateman referred as “the cycle of non-accountability, (Bateman
2017, p. 98)” if not addressed often will lead to IEPs that will not meet the Endrew F. standard.
If school district officials do not if not address the non-accountability cycle often will lead to
IEPs that will not meet the Endrew F. standard. School district officials can best address these
problems through training of administrators and teachers in their (a) obligations under the
IDEA, and (b) methods to ensure that IEPs include relevant and thorough assessments and
measurable and measured goals (Hott et al. 2021).
According to both the Rowley and the Endrew F., rulings, the advancement from grades
to grades are suitable progress for some students with disabilities but not for all students.
In the U.S. Supreme Court ‘s opinion, Chief Justice of the John Roberts expressed this issue
as follows:
Rowley sheds light on what appropriate progress will look like in many cases: For
a child fully integrated in the regular classroom [emphasis added], an IEP typically should
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be “reasonably calculated to enable the child to achieve passing marks and advance from
grade to grade . . . . Rowley did not provide concrete guidance with respect to a child who
is not fully integrated in the regular classroom and not able to achieve on grade level. A
child’s IEP need not aim for grade-level advancement if that is not a reasonable prospect [emphasis
added]. But that child’s educational program must be appropriately ambitious in light of
his circumstances, just as advancement from grade to grade is appropriately ambitious for
most children in the regular classroom. The goals may differ, but every child should have the
chance to meet challenging objectives [emphasis added] (Endrew. F., 2017, p. 922).
According to the Endrew F. FAPE standard a goal of advancing from grade to grade
may not be a viable option; clearly some students with disabilities should have IEP goals
that specifically address their unique academic and functional characteristics. Moreover,
these students will require goals that are ambitious and challenging in accordance with
their individualized needs. In such situations school officials could be required to “provide
a cogent and responsive explanation for their decisions that shows the IEP is reasonably
calculated to enable the child to make progress appropriate in light of his circumstances”
(Endrew F., 2017, p. 993). We suggest, therefore, that IEP teams craft measurable annual
goals for students with disabilities that are ambitious, but reasonable.
Another lesson to be learned from the Endrew F. case is that IEP teams need to
continually, at least annually, review the goals the have team has set for students. Even if a
student has not yet completed a goal, IEP teams should continue to adjust goals so that
they are ambitious and challenging. Refurbishing an IEP with the same or similar goals
is often not enough to show ambitious growth. This does not mean old goals should be
immediately disregarded but should be continually evaluated just as a student’s progress
toward a goal is monitored. For example, a goal that involved counting change could be
adjusted to be more ambitious and focus on new, but similar, skills such as having the
student identify the coins and ordering them in value.
As there is no way to predict every circumstance that will arise or the multitude of
different goals, IEP teams may want to focus on some guiding questions such as: Is the
student’s goal(s) ambitious enough for them? If the goal is calculated to enable students to
show progress throughout the year then team members need to ask themselves, what data
do we have that shows the student is in fact making or not making progress on this goal? Finally, if
a student has an ambitious goal and data, the final question to ask may be, what is limiting
progress for this student, and what can the district do to help alleviate that setback? With these
guiding ideas in mind, IEP teams may be able to avoid a situation similar to the one faced
by the Douglas County School District in the Endrew F. case. Figure 4 is a checklist that
school districts may follow to prevent such errors.
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Rowley (1982) and Endrew F. (2017) have very much shaped the special landscape with 
respect to the provision of FAPE to students with disabilities eligible under the IDEA. 
Although there is no bright line as to what a FAPE is for an individual student, hearing 
offers, administrative law judges, and state and federal judges are guided by the two-part 
Rowley/Endrew F. test in determining FAPE: (a) did the school district adhere to the pro-
cedural requirements of the IDEA, and (b) were students’ IEPs reasonably calculated to 
enable them to make progress appropriate in light of their circumstances. Understanding 
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6. Summary
Rowley (1982) and Endrew F. (2017) have very much shaped the special landscape
with respect to the provision of FAPE to students with disabilities eligible under the IDEA.
Although there is no bright line as to what a FAPE is for an individual student, hearing
offers, administrative law judges, and state and federal judges are guided by the two-
part Rowley/Endrew F. test in determining FAPE: (a) did the school district adhere to the
procedural requirements of the IDEA, and (b) were students’ IEPs reasonably calculated to
enable them to make progress appropriate in light of their circumstances. Understanding
and following this two-part test will help to ensure that school districts offer procedurally
and substantively correct IEPs.
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